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"The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth
and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing-one person, one
vote."'
I. INTRODUCTION
E ver since the United States Supreme Court entered the "political
thicket"' of redistricting and reapportionment 3 courts and legisla-
tures have been struggling with issues relating to the Court's mandate of
"one person, one vote."4 The re-drawing of congressional and legislative
district boundaries after the 1980 census was only the third time that
district boundaries have been drawn according to the Supreme Court's
mandate of "one person-one vote."
Round One of redistricting occurred during the 1960's in the wake of
Baker v. Carr,5 which invalidated the gross malapportionment of congres-
' Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
2 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
3 Technically, the members of the United States House of Representatives are "appor-
tioned" among the states, and then "districted" into congressional districts by the states.
The courts, however, have used the terms interchangably. See, for example, Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion in Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973), where he refers to "a state reappor-
tionment statute for federal congressional districts." Id. at 320. Before Baker, many states
"apportioned" seats in their state legislature to counties or other governmental units. Legis-
lative seats are now "districted" into equally populated districts rather than "apportioned"
to counties. However, many states attempt to preserve political subdivision lines in state
legislative districts. Thus, in this Article, redistricting will refer to the process of re-drawing
congressional districts, and reapportionment will refer to re-drawing state legislative or
other political districts.
' See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964).
- 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Three statistics are important in understanding redistricting ter-
minology. The "ideal" district consists of the total population of the area to be districted
divided by the number of districts (the arithmetic mean). The "average deviation" (or vari-
ance) consists of the average of all the districts' deviations from equality. The "maximum
total deviation" (or variance), usually expressed as a percent or a ratio, is the amount by
which the largest and smallest district populations are greater than and less than the popu-
lation of the ideal district.
Thus, if a state has a population of 1,000,000 persons and 100 districts, the ideal district
would contain 10,000 persons. If the largest district contained 11,0000 persons (10% above
equality), and the smallest district had 9,000 persons (10% below equality), the maximum
total deviation would be 2,000 persons, or 20%.
The early cases often referred to the percent of voters able to elect a majority of members
of each house. However, this type of reference is deceiving, since 51% of the voters in 51%
of the districts (or 26% of the state's population) could conceivably elect a majority of a
state legislature. See, e.g., Engstrom, Post-Census Representational Districting: The Su-
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sional and other districts. Round Two of redistricting and reapportion-
ment occurred after the 1970 census. The result was the evolution of
standards for evaluating redistricting and reapportionment plans, includ-
ing plans drawn by both legislative bodies and the courts.' These stan-
dards led to differences between challenges to congressional and state leg-
islative redistricting. Round Three resulted in challenges to the
redistricting and reapportionment of the early 1980's.
This Article discusses the legal requirements of one person-one vote
and the continuing evolution of the legal standards in this area. Part II
analyzes the evolution of one person-one vote doctrine in the United
States Supreme Court cases of the 1960's and 1970's. Part III discusses
Round Three and focuses on the cases in state and lower federal courts.
Included in this section are discussions of the New Jersey and Wyoming
cases,7 the latest decisions of the Court on redistricting and reapportion-
ment. Part IV examines several unresolved issues in the one person-one
vote field, and concludes that the issues of gerrymandering8 and fine-tun-
ing of the mathematics of one person-one vote should be confronted in
Round IV, the next round of redistricting and reapportionment cases.
II. BACKGROUND-ROUNDS I AND II
Before Baker, courts consistently left the issues of redistricting and re-
apportionment to the political process, which inevitably meant that the
effects of malapportionment went uncorrected.' By the time Baker was
preme Court, "One Person, One Vote," and the Gerrymandering Issue, 7 So. U.L. REV. 173
(1981); McKay, Reapportionment: Success Story of the Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REV.
223 (1968).
6 Dodge & McCauley, Reapportionment: A Survey of the Practicality of Voting Equal-
ity, 43 U. Pirr. L. REV. 527 (1982).
7 Karcher v. Daggett, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2653 (1983); Brown v. Thomson, - U.S.
-, 103 S. Ct. 2690 (1983).
8 "Gerrymandering" derives its name from Eldridge Gerry, former Governor of Massa-
chusetts. In 1812, while Gerry was in office, a newspaper editor noted that one legislative
district drawn for maximum partisan advantage looked like a salamander.
Gerrymandering is defined as:
the practice of creating districting arrangements which dilute the voting strength
of an identifiable group of voters, impending [sic] the group's ability to convert its
electoral strength into the selection of representatives affiliated with it, or at least
favored by it. This is accomplished by dispersing the group's voting strength
across districts so that it constitutes ineffective minorities of voters within those
districts and/or by concentrating its strength into districts in which it comprises
extraordinary majorities of voters.
Engstrom, supra note 5, at 207.
9 Rural bias often occurred where the urban-rural differentials in district populations
were large. "For example, in California the 6,380,771 residents of Los Angeles County
elected one member of the State Senate, just as the 14,294 residents of the combined coun-
ties of Mono, Inyo and Alpine did." Id. at 176. Professor Engstrom notes that these legisla-
tures created malapportioned congressional districts, ranging from 118.5 of the ideal dis-
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decided, in 1962, plaintiffs faced a formidable array of decisions holding
that reapportionment was a "political" and therefore non-justiciable
question. 10
Baker involved a challenge to Tennessee's legislative districts which
had not been re-drawn since 1901.11 The situation in Tennessee in 1962
was far from unique. In twelve states in 1962 at least one state legislative
district deviated more than 500% from average. Deviations of congres-
sional districts exceeded 50% in as many states. Over 200 congressional
districts deviated from each state's average by more than 10%,12 leading
a commentator to suggest that "[w]e are permitting the streams of legis-
lation to become poisoned at the sources.""3
In an opinion by Justice Brennan, the Baker Court held that the Ten-
nessee plaintiffs had raised a "justiciable constitutional cause of action,"
thus disposing of the "political question" doctrine that had for decades
trict in Texas to -71.4% from the ideal in Michigan. Id. at 178. See also R. DIXON,
DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS 630-31 (1968);
T. O'RouRKE, THE IMPACT OF REAPPORTIONMENT (1980).
o Most prominent among the cases holding that districting challenges were not justicia-
ble was Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), a challenge to Illinois' congressional dis-
tricts. Illinois' districts were among the most malapportioned in the nation, ranging in popu-
lation from 914,053 residents in one district to 112,116 residents in another, and had not
been redistricted since 1901. Illustrating the Court's reluctance to enter into a "political"
area, Justice Frankfurter stated, "[i]t is hostile to a democratic system to involve the judici-
ary in the politics of the people." Id. at 553-54. A number of cases followed the lead of
Colegrove. See, e.g., Matthews v. Handley, 361 U.S. 127 (1959); Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S.
916 (1958); Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957); Kidd v. McCanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956);
Anderson v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952); Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952); Remmey v.
Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1952); Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors, 339 U.S. 940 (1950); Colegrove
v. Barret, 330 U.S. 804 (1947); Turman v. Duckworth, 329 U.S. 675 (1946); Cook v. Fortson,
329 U.S. 675 (1946). However, a small opening occurred in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339 (1960). In Gomillion the Court entertained a challenge to the re-drawing of Tuskeegee's
city boundaries from a square to "an uncouth 28-sided figure" for the purpose of excluding
all but four or five blacks from municipal elections. Gomillion, however, is more properly
considered a "voter exclusion" case, rather than a redistricting case, since the voters were
totally excluded from municipal elections.
" The result of neglected reapportionment was that 28.7% of the state's population
could elect a majority of the House of Representatives. Urban areas were severely under-
represented, receiving only 18% of the Senate seats and 20% of the State House of Repre-
sentatives seats while accounting for 42% of the state's population. Engstrom, supra note 5,
at 184.
"2 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT DATA
BOOK, 93RD CONG. (1973) [hereinafter cited as DATA BOOK].
" Chafee, Congressional Reapportionment, 42 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1016 (1929). H.L.
Mencken observed in 1928 that "[tihe yokels hang on because old apportionments give them
unfair advantages. The vote of a malicious peasant on the lower eastern shore counts as
much as the votes of twelve Baltimoreans. . . . It is not only unjust and undemocratic, it is
absurd." H.L. MENCKEN, H.L. MENCKEN ON POLICIES: A CARNIVAL OF BUNCOMBE 164 (1960).
See also Dixon, The Court, The People and One Man, One Vote, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN
THE 1970's (N. Polsby ed. 1971).
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prevented plaintiffs from bringing districting challenges."'
Baker "opened the courthouse doors"1 5 and subsequent plaintiffs have
rushed through. Within a year, challenges were made to legislative or con-
gressional districts in over thirty states. 6
Justice Douglas hinted at the standard for evaluating districting plans
in Gray v. Sanders'1 7 the first of the cases after Baker to reach the Court.
Gray involved a successful challenge to Georgia's "county-unit" system
employed in its state-wide Democratic primary. Justice Douglas noted
that while Baker was a challenge to state legislative districting, Gray as-
sailed the state's method of weighting votes from rural counties. However,
he clearly indicated in dicta that one person-one vote should be the stan-
dard for all elections.18
The adoption of this standard occurred in Wesberry v. Sanders,19 a
challenge to Georgia's malapportioned congressional districts. In an opin-
ion by Justice Black, the Court held for the first time that congressional
districts should be of substantially equal population. "[TIhe command of
Art. I, § 2, and that Representatives be chosen 'by the People of the Sev-
eral states' means that as nearly as practicable one man's vote in a con-
gressional election is to be worth as much as another's."' Inviting future
" 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962). For a discussion of the political question doctrine, see Neal,
Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 SuP. CT. REv. 252 (1962).
15 R. DIXON, supra note 9, at 159.
is For a list of these challenges, see McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts, 61
MICH. L. REv. 645, 706-10 app. (1963).
" Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963). "The case was riled, it is said, within half an
hour after the decision in Baker v. Gray was announced." Lucas, Legislative Apportionment
and Representative Government, 61 MICH. L. REv. 711, 786 (1963). The "unit votes" of
each county were given on a "winner-take-all" basis to the candidate receiving the highest
number of votes within the county. Each county had two votes for each seat in the legisla-
ture, up to a maximum of six "unit votes." Votes of residents in the Atlanta area (Fulton
County) were diluted due to the malapportionment of the legislature and the six vote limit.
Fulton County, with a population of 556,326 persons, had six votes, while Echols County,
with a population of 1,876, had two votes. 372 U.S. at 372.
Id. at 379.
Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is desig-
nated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote-whatever
their race, whatever their sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their income
and wherever their home may be in that geographical unit. This is required by the
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.
Id.
19 376 U.S. 1 (1964). Georgia's fifth district, including Fulton County, had a population
of 823,680 or more than three times the population of the smallest district, the ninth, with a
population of only 272,154.
,0 Id. at 7, 8. Justice Black's interpretation of the meaning of Art. I, § 2 was challenged
in a vigorous dissent by Justice Harlan, who noted that
[n]othing that the Court does today will disturb the fact that although in 1960 the
population of an average congressional district was 410,481, the States of Alaska,
Nevada and Wyoming each have a Representative in Congress although their re-
spective populations are 226,167, 285,278, and 330,046. It is whimsical to assert in
1983-84]
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litigation on precisely what standards should be followed in redistricting
cases, Justice Black stated that "[t]he question of what relief should be
given we leave for further consideration and decision by the District
Court in light of existing circumstances."2
The one person-one vote doctrine was extended to state legislative dis-
tricts a few weeks later in Reynolds v. Sims,2 2 a challenge to the Alabama
legislative districts. The Alabama legislature had not been reapportioned
since 1900 despite the state's constitutional provisions for decennial ad-
justment. The resulting population disparities2 s were held by the district
court to violate equal protection, and the Supreme Court agreed:
To the extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that
much less a citizen. . . .The weight of a citizen's vote cannot be
made to depend upon where he lives. Population is, of necessity,
the starting point for consideration and the controlling criterion
for judgment in legislative apportionment controversies. . . .[A]s
the face of this guarantee [that each state have at least one representative] that an
absolute principle of "equal representation in the House for equal numbers of
people" is "solemnly embodied" in Article I.
Id. at 28-29 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Given this inequality in the "target population" of
states, the standard really is that one person's vote in a congressional election in the same
state should be worth as much as another's. Nonetheless, the "command" of Article I, § 2 is
now a "fundamental principle of districting." See Engstrom, supra note 5, at 189. See also
infra text accompanying notes 164-68.
For a discussion of the use of history in Wesberry and other cases in the 1960's, see Kelly,
Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 119 (1965).
2 376 U.S. at 4. Note also, Justice Harlan's comments in dissent:
The Court's "as nearly as is practicable" formula sweeps a host of questions under
the rug. How great a difference between the populations of various districts within
a State is tolerable? Is the standard an absolute or relative one, and if the latter to
what is the difference in population to be related? Does the number of districts
within a State have any relevance? Is the number of voters or number of inhabi-
tants controlling? Is the relevant statistic the greatest disparity between any two
districts in the State or the average departure from the average population per
district, or a little of both? May the State consider factors such as area or natural
boundaries (rivers, mountain ranges) which are plainly relevant to the practicabil-
ity of effective representation?
There is an obvious lack of criteria for answering questions such as these, which
points up the impropriety of the Court's wholehearted but heavy-footed entrance
into the political arena.
Id. at 21 n.4 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
2 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Reynolds was decided along with five companion cases: Lucas v.
44th Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (Colorado); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633
(1964) (New York); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation and Taxes v. Tawes, 377 U.S.
656 (1964) (Maryland); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) (Virginia); and Roman v. Sin-
cock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964) (Delaware).
'3 While several alternate plans had been adopted by the Alabama legislature since
Baker, under even the best of these plans 27% of the state's population resided in a major-
ity of the Senate districts and 37% in a majority of the House districts. The districts devi-
ated from equality from 20-1 in the Senate to 5-1 in the House. 377 U.S. at 545-50.
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a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection Clause re-
quires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legisla-
ture must be apportioned on a population basis."4
Because challenges to state legislative districts were based upon the
equal protection clause rather than the Article I "command" of equi-
populous congressional districts, the mathematical standard that the
Warren Court formulated for state districts did not appear as strict as the
standard for congressional districts.2 5 What was required of states was
"an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of
its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable."' 6
Before the 1970 census, the Court reviewed a number of lower court
redistricting and reapportionment decisions. In a Florida case, Swann v.
Adams,2" the Court invalidated both the State Senate and House districts
because they deviated so much from the ideal. Furthermore, there was
"no attempt to justify any particular deviations, even the larger ones."28
In another case, invalidating a Texas House of Representatives redistrict-
ing plan that had a maximum deviation of 23.48%, the Court held in a
brief per curiam opinion that deviations of this size must be "satisfacto-
rily justified."'
The last major decisions in Round I were announced on April 7, 1969,
just one year before the 1970 census was taken. In these decisions nearly
21 Id. at 567-68 (emphasis added).
"' "We realize that it is a practical impossibility to arrange legislative districts so that
each one has an identical number of residents, or citizens, or voters. Mathematical exactness
or precision is hardly a workable constitutional requirement." Id. at 577. "So long as the
divergences from a strict population standard are based on legitimate considerations inci-
dent to the effectuation of a rational state policy, some deviations from the equal-popula-
tion principle are constitutionally permissible." Id. at 579 (emphasis added). Much of the
litigation in Rounds II and III would center around precisely what considerations are "legit-
imate" and what size deviations these considerations could justify.
so Id. at 577 (emphasis added). One week after deciding these cases, the Court invali-
dated the apportionment of nine more state legislatures: Pinney v. Butterworth, 378 U.S.
564 (1964) (Connecticut); Swann v. Adams, 378 U.S. 553 (1964) (Florida); Hearne v. Smylie,
378 U.S. 563 (1964) (Idaho); Germano v. Kerner, 378 U.S. 560 (1964) (Illinois); Hill v. Davis,
378 U.S. 565 (1964) (Iowa); Marshall v. Hare, 378 U.S. 561 (1964) (Michigan); Nolan v.
Rhodes, 378 U.S. 556 (1964) (Ohio); Williams v. Moss, 378 U.S. 558 (1964) (Oklahoma); and
Meyers v. Thigpen, 378 U.S. 554 (1964) (Washington). Indeed, by the end of 1964 the Su-
preme Court was in the middle of the "political thicket" of redistricting and
reapportionment.
27 385 U.S. 440 (1967). The Senate districts had a maximum deviation of 25.65% or a
ratio for the largest to smallest district of 1.30 to 1. The House districts had a maximum
deviation of 33.55% and a ratio of 1.41 to 1.
28 Id. at 445.
2 Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967). The Court also applied the one person-one vote
standard to local levels of government. See, e.g., Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50
(1970); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1969). For a criticism of this extension, see
Note, Reapportionment-Nine Years into the "Revolution" and Still Struggling, 70 MICH.
L. REV. 586 (1972).
1983-841
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every justification for population deviations in congressional districts was
held unacceptable by the Court. In a challenge to Missouri's congressional
districts, the Court expanded on the equal population principle of Wes-
berry, holding that "the State must justify each variance, no matter how
small.""0 The deviations involved in the Missouri challenge were less than
six percent. New York districts, invalidated by Wells v. Rockefeller3 1 had
a greater maximum deviation of 12.096%. However, dissent was not lack-
ing. Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, termed these decisions
"Draconian," criticizing the majority for transforming "a political slogan
into a constitutional absolute.
3 2
By the end of the 1960's it appeared to many commentators that the
"arithmetic-straitjacket" 3 rule applied to both congressional and legisla-
tive districts.3 4 Round II however, clarified the distinction between stan-
dards for congressional and other districts.
The second round of challenges to reapportionment and redistricting
after the 1970 census resulted in the development of a bifurcated ap-
proach to standards for state legislative and congressional districts. While
the Round I cases were decided during the Warren Court years,
Round II challenges arose during the early years of the Burger Court.
The new personnel on the Court continued to apply a strict standard to
congressional redistricting, while developing less stringent standards for
evaluating reapportionment plans for state legislatures.
The first case in Round II to articulate this bifurcated approach was
Mahan v. Howell, 5 a challenge to Virginia's 1971 legislative reapportion-
" Kirkpatrick v. Priesler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969). Each of Missouri's justifications for
deviations of 5.97 % were held unacceptable. Noting that the legislature had before it several
plans with smaller population deviations, the Court found that the population variances
were "not unavoidable." Id. Other justifications found unacceptable for deviations of this
size included avoiding fragmentation of "areas with distinct economic and social interests,"
use of an "eligible voter" population base, and post-census population shifts. Id. at 533-36.
" 394 U.S. 542 (1969). New York had split the state into seven distinct regions and
created districts within these regions that were close in population to the other districts
within the region. However, the plan resulted in relatively large deviations for the entire
state. This scheme did not meet the command "to equalize population in all the districts of
the State. . . . Equality of population among districts in a sub-state is not a justification for
inequality among all the districts in the State." Id. at 545-46.
After the Wells decision Republicans gained control of the legislature and Governor's of-
fice and constructed a redistricting plan designed to benefit the Republican Party while
achieving population equality, much to the consternation of the original litigant. "Wells re-
turned to the federal district court in February 1970 to plead that if it did nothing else it at
least should restore the plan he had successfully contested the year before." Dixon, One
Man, One Vote-What Next?, 60 NAT'L Civic REv. 265, 267 (1971).
" 394 U.S. at 549-50 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
" Dixon, The Warren Court Crusade for the Holy Grail of One Man, One Vote, 1969
SuP. CT. REV. 219, 226 (1969).
"' For an excellent review of the theory and politics of Rounds I and II, see Bickerstaff,
Reapportionment by State Legislatures: A Guide for the 1980's, 34 Sw. L.J. 607 (1980).
35 410 U.S. 315 (1973). Justice Rehnquist argued that states were afforded "broader lati-
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ment. Holding that the state had justified the 16% population deviations
by its policy of not splitting political subdivisions, Justice Rehnquist
stated that the plan "may reasonably be said to advance the rational
state policy of respecting the boundaries of political subdivisions ...
While this percentage may well approach tolerable limits, we do not be-
lieve it exceeds them.'" White v. Regester,s1 decided later the same
Term, established that some de minimis deviations in state legislative dis-
tricts need not be justified at all. Justice Brennan dissented, noting that
most state legislatures had assumed that the same standard controlled
legislative reapportionment as well as congressional redistricting: "[Tihe
outgrowth of that assumption has been a truly extraordinary record of
compliance with the constitutional mandate."" To establish a new stan-
dard for state legislative districts would allow too much deviation from
the goal of population equality, according to Justice Brennan. However,
tude" under equal protection clause challenges to reapportionment. Id. Therefore, reappor-
tionment plans were "not to be judged by the more stringent standards of Kirkpatrick,"
which was expressly limited to congressional redistricting challenges. Id. See Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964) ("[mlathematical exactness ... is hardly a workable consti-
tutional requirement" for state legislative districts).
11 410 U.S. at 328, 329. A different statistical method calculated the deviation of the
multi-member plan at 23.6%, but Justice Rehnquist "declined to enter this imbroglio of
mathematical manipulation" and used the statistics used by the lower court. Id.
1 412 U.S. 755 (1973). White involved a challenged to the Texas legislative reapportion-
ment. The Court held that population deviations of 9.9% in the state's reapportionment
plan did not satisfy "the threshold requirement of proving a prima facie case of invidious
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause," despite the fact that no "acceptable"
justifications were offered for the deviations. Id. at 764. Justice Brennan's dissent pointed
out that the Round II cases meant that "one can reasonably surmise that a line has been
drawn at 10%-deviations in excess of that amount are apparently acceptable only on a
showing of justification by the State; deviations less than that amount require no justifica-
tion whatsoever." Id. at 777 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S.
182 (1971) (11.9% variance in county legislature must be justified).
38 412 U.S. at 79. The following table from the United States Census Bureau indicates
that the redistricting picture changed rapidly from 1960 to 1970. Population deviations con-
tinue to be reduced in the 98th Congress.
Table 1: Population Deviations of Congressional Districts
88th, 93rd and 98th Congresses
(1963, 1973 and 1983)
Percentage Deviation CONGRESS
from State Average 88th 93rd 98th
Less than 1% 9 385 411
1 -5% 81 41 18
5 - 10% 87 3 -
10% and over 236 -
See DATA BOOK, supra note 12, at ix.
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the "higher mathematics" of one person-one vote was a major flaw in his
argument. Justice Brennan recognized that "percentage figures tend to
hide the total number of persons affected by unequal weighting of
votes," 9 but he nonetheless suggested that the majority "establishes a
wide margin of tolerable error, and thereby undermines the effort" to
achieve population equality. 0 However, the small size of state legislative
districts combined with legitimate local concerns justifies the acceptabil-
ity of higher percentage deviations. 4 1
Despite the relaxation of mathematical precision for state legislative
apportionment, the Burger Court remained steadfast in applying strin-
gent standards in some one person-one vote cases. Invalidating Texas'
congressional districts, which deviated from equality by only 4.13%, the
Court clearly indicated that the less stringent review of reapportionment
plans did not extend to congressional redistricting.4 2 The Burger Court
has also held both court-ordered redistricting and reapportionment plans
to strict standards.43
Thus, by the end of Round II the Court had established that devia-
tions in state legislative reapportionments could be justified by a number
of consistently applied policies, but almost no population deviation
among congressional districts would be tolerated.
III. CHALLENGES TO THE 1980 REDISTRICTING (ROUND III)
Challenges to redistricting and reapportionment after the 1980 census 44
39 412 U.S. at 781. For example, in a state with 10,000,000 persons, a 10% deviation in
20 congressional districts would mean a deviation of only 50,000 persons, while a 10% devia-
tion in the same state's 50 State Senate districts would mean a deviation of 20,000 persons.
10 Id. at 779. "[To consider a certain range of variances de minimis would encourage
legislators to strive for that range rather than for equality." Id. (quoting Kirkpatrick v.
Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969)).
" For an example of why higher percent deviations in state legislative districts may be
tolerable, see supra note 39.
4" White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973). The existence of other plans with smaller popu-
lation deviations clearly demonstrated that the deviations were "not unavoidable" and were
not justified by either the state's policy of preserving political sub-division boundaries or
preserving the seniority of the state's congressional delegation. Id. at 790, 791.
13 Chapman v.Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975). "[U]nless there are persuasive justifications, a
court-ordered reapportionment plan of a state legislature must avoid the use of multimem-
ber districts, and, as well, must ordinarily achieve the goal of population equality with little
more than de minimis variations." Id. at 26-27. See also Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407
(1977) (16.5% variance in court-ordered plan not acceptable).
" Some plaintiffs also challenged the accuracy and reliability of the census itself, but
were not successful. See, e.g., Young v. Klutznick, 497 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Mich. 1980),
rev'd, 652 F.2d 617 (6th Cir.) (Mayor and City of Detroit lacked standing to bring action
and issue was so hypothetical that it was not capable of judicial resolution), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 939 (1981); Carey v. Klutznick, 508 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 653 F.2d
732 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982) (denied request to adjust census for
alleged undercount of minorities). See also BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
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continued under the precedents set in Rounds I and II. Population devia-
tions in congressional districts were given the strictest scrutiny, while de-
viations of up to 10% seemed acceptable for most state legislative
reapportionments.
Other differences existed between congressional redistricting and state
legislative reapportionment. Deadlocks in the political process were sig-
nificant in bringing about court-ordered redistricting, but not nearly as
much so in state legislative reapportionment. The issue of staggered sena-
torial elections occupied a central role in reapportionment plans. Geo-
graphic considerations were also important in reapportionments.
At the same time, however, the lower courts have followed the Supreme
Court's lead in Gaffney v. Cummings,45 and maintained a consistent pol-
icy of avoiding issues of partisan gerrymandering. On the other hand, bla-
tantly racial gerrymanders have been invalidated by the courts, although
challenges based on racial discrimination have not been raised as often as
in the early years of the one person-one vote battle.
Nineteen states46 have seen challenges to congressional district bounda-
ries drawn after the 1980 census while thirty-one states47 have had chal-
lenges to post-1980 legislative reapportionments.
The "box score" of challenges to the 1980 redistricting and reappor-
tionment which follows shows that challengers were successful in over-
turning, modifying, or bringing about court-imposed districts in fifteen of
the nineteen congressional redistricting cases discussed in section 2.1
Three challenges were not successful, and one case is still pending.48
MERCE, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, DATA USERS GUIDE 100 (1981); Bailey,
The Census, The Undercount and Black Power in Electoral Politics, reprinted in BLACK
PEOPLE AND THE 1980 CENSUS: PROCEEDINGS FROM A CONFERENCE ON THE POPULATION UN-
DERCOUNT 534 (1980); Kirksey, The Black Undercount and Political Issues, reprinted in
BLACK PEOPLE AND THE 1980 CENSUS: PROCEEDINGS FROM A CONFERENCE ON THE POPULATION
UNDERCOUNT 233 (1980); Note, Constitutional Implications of a Population Undercount:
Making Sense of the Census Clause, 69 GEO. L.J. 1427 (1981) (concluding that the census
should be adjusted for an undercount).
" 412 U.S. 735 (1973). Beyond requiring population equality "we have not ventured far
or attempted the impossible task of extripating politics from what are the essentially politi-
cal processes of the sovereign States." Id. at 753-54.
40 The states are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kan-
sas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylva-
nia, South Carolina, Texas and West Virginia.
Six states (Alaska, Delaware, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont and Wyoming) are
entitled to only one member in the House of Representatives. Seven other states (Hawaii,
Idaho, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire and Rhode Island) have only two
Representatives.
" See infra text accompanying notes 48-49.
" A challenge to congressional districts remains pending in West Virginia.
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One Person-One Vote: Round III
BOX SCORE
Congressional
District
[Vol. 32:569
Legislative
District
State Challenge Challenge
Alabama N
Alaska * y
Arizona Y y
Arkansas Y
California N
Connecticut N
Colorado Y y
Delaware *
Florida Y
Georgia Y
Hawaii Y y
Idaho y
Illinois y Y
Indiana Pndg.
Iowa
Kansas Y N
Kentucky
Louisiana Y
Maine Pndg.
Maryland N
Massachusetts **
Michigan y
Minnesota Y y
Mississippi Y
Missouri y
Montana N
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire N
New Jersey y
New Mexico Y
New York N N
North Carolina
North Dakota *
Ohio Y
Oklahoma
Oregon N
Pennsylvania N N
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Rhode Island Y
South Carolina Y
South Dakota * N
Tennessee Pndg.
Texas Y Y
Utah Pndg.
Virginia Y
Vermont *Y
Washington
Wisconsin Y
West Virginia Pndg. Pndg.
Wyoming * N
Key: Y = Successful Challenge
N = Unsuccessful Challenge
• = Only 1 Congressional District
* * = Did not reapportion after 1980
Phdg. = Case currently pending
The box score illustrates that plaintiffs had a lower batting average in
attacking state legislative reapportionments. Fourteen reapportionment
plans were modified at least in part, while twelve plans were upheld. Five
reapportionment cases remain pending.49
A. Congressional Redistricting Challenges
1. Political Deadlocks
Court-ordered plans were developed in five states not because a validly
enacted plan violated constitutional requirements, but because the courts
were required to break a stalemate in the political process. In Colorado,50
" The Maryland Court of Appeals has dismissed the 10 challenges to the Maryland leg-
islative reapportionment by a per curiam order, with a full opinion pending. Letter from the
Maryland Sec. of State to the author (Sept. 7, 1983). Kansas reapportioned in 1979 using
the results of a state census. The state was not constitutionally mandated to reapportion in
1980. Bacon v. Carlin, 575 F. Supp. 763 (D. Kan. 1983).
50 Governor Lamm, a Democrat, vetoed three separate attempts at congressional redis-
tricting by the Republican-dominated legislature. Following the second veto, plaintiffs sued
for court-ordered redistricting. After the third veto, the court concluded that "the fate of
redistricting has reached an impasse." Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68, 76 (D. Colo.
1982).
The court reviewed 22 plans submitted by interested parties, but testimony focused on
five plans with population deviations from 7-15 persons, or .0015% to .0031%. "To select
one plan over another on the basis of population equality when only sixteen one-
thousandths of a percent separates the plans ignores the realities of fair and effective repre-
sentation." Id. at 92. The court noted that "[o]n balance, no one plan represents the best
effort at providing fair and effective representation ... because each plan has several unde-
sirable elements which tend to outweigh any advantages." Id. at 93. The disadvantage
mainly consisted of the fact that each plan divided counties or other political subdivisions.
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Kansas, 51 Minnesota,52 Missouri53 and South Carolina,54 elected officials
were unable to agree on redistricting bills. While avowedly reluctant to do
so, district court panels in each case ordered implementation of a court-
imposed plan because a refusal to do so would have led to the use of the
1970 districts, since rendered constitutionally obsolete by the results of
the 1980 census.55
2. Racial Discrimination
Redistricting plans were challenged on racial discrimination grounds in
The court therefore developed its own plan incorporating the most desirable portions of
each. For an interesting but tangential aspect of the Colorado story, see Combined Commu-
nications Corp. v. Finesilver, 672 F.2d 818 (10th Cir. 1982) (denied writ of mandamus appli-
cation to order judge to permit television coverage of negotiations, holding that provisions of
the Colorado "Sunshine Law" were not applicable).
51 In Kansas, plaintiffs brought suit after an apparent deadlock between the Republican
legislature and the Democratic governor over redistricting. Governor Carlin had vetoed two
redistricting bills, and the Kansas legislature was about to adjourn. One set of plaintiffs
urged the court to adopt a plan favored by the Governor, while another supported the most
recent bill to pass the legislature. Because both plans contained only small population devi-
ations (the Governor's plan contained deviations of .11%, and the legislative plan deviated
from equality by .09%) the court applied other factors, and attached "great importance to
the preservation of county and municipal boundaries." O'Sullivan v. Brier, 540 F. Supp.
1200, 1203 (D. Kan. 1982). The court adopted a plan introduced in the legislature, but not
passed by either branch, which was virtually identical to the Governor's plan, preserving
county boundaries and containing a maximum deviation of only .338%.
51 A deadlock in the legislature led to a three-judge district court's imposition of a redis-
tricting scheme for Minnesota's eight congressional districts. Because 48.7% of Minnesota's
population lived in metropolitan areas, the court selected a plan similar to one developed by
the Democrat-Farm-Labor (DFL) party creating four metropolitan districts over a Republi-
can plan that would have created three districts. LaComb v. Growe, 541 F. Supp. 145
(D. Minn. 1982). The dissent noted that in 1971 the state's metropolitan population was
49.3%, but the legislature "did not deem it necessary to adopt a congressional reapportion-
ment plan based upon four metropolitan districts." Id. at 156 (Alsop, J., dissenting).
63 The Missouri legislature failed to redistrict the state after a special session was called
by the Governor for this purpose. A three-judge district court then drew its own redistrict-
ing plan. Shaver v. Kirkpatrick, 541 F. Supp. 922 (W.D. Mo. 1982).
A three-judge panel ordered implementation of a plan adopted by the South Carolina
House of Representatives as the "most acceptable" of the several plans brought before it. In
addition to containing a low population deviation of .28%, the House plan also kept most
counties intact, unlike the alternate scheme. Except for modifying one boundary line split-
ting a naval facility, the House plan was adopted as introduced in the House. South Caro-
lina State Conf. of Branches of NAACP v. Riley, 533 F. Supp. 1178 (D.S.C. 1982).
"" Two courts rejected the remedy of resorting to at-large elections in states where no
redistricting plan was enacted, under 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c)(5) (1982). See, e.g., Shaver v. Kirk-
patrick, 541 F. Supp. 922 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (§ 2a(c)(5) was implicitly repealed by 2 U.S.C.
§ 2c). But see Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68 (D. Colo. 1982) (§ 2a(c)(5) was a "lim-
ited stop-gap measure" intended to be used when a redistricting scheme was found invalid
and there is insufficient time to implement a court-imposed plan). At-large congressional
elections are also politically unsound, since candidates for Congress would be required to
wage expensive state-wide campaigns for probably only one election.
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only five states during Round III, perhaps because discrimination in
most states is less obvious than it was in the 1960's. The more subtle
nature of discrimination leads to problems in proving discriminatory in-
tent.56 In Busbee v. Smith,57 however, a three-judge panel found one of
the most blatant cases of racial discrimination in the 1980's in a Georgia
redistricting plan. Georgia sought a declaratory judgment that its 1981
congressional redistricting plan did not violate the Voting Rights Act of
196558 after the Attorney General had found that the plan did violate the
Act. In addition to a showing of a long history of discrimination in Geor-
gia, the 1981 redistricting plan was shown to have both discriminatory
impact and intent.5 The court noted that State Representative Joe Mack
Wilson, the chairman of the House redistricting committee, expressed his
standards for redistricting by telling one Republican member of the reap-
portionment committee that "there are some things worse than niggers
and that's Republicans."6 0
According to the Busbee court, a motion for declaratory judgment re-
quires the state to demonstrate absence of discriminatory purpose. That
the Georgia plan had a discriminatory purpose was indicated by testi-
mony that Wilson stated that "the Justice Department is trying to make
us draw nigger districts, and I don't want to draw nigger districts.""
Arizona's congressional and legislative redistricting plans failed to win
the Attorney General's approval since they divided the 8,000 members of
" "There are two reapportionment struggles going on in America-one based on popula-
tion, the other based on race. While population-based reapportionment has been successful
in the courts, racially-based reapportionment has been a failure." Smith, The Failure of
Reapportionment: The Effect of Reapportionment on the Election of Blacks to Legislative
Bodies, 18 How. L.J. 639, 639 (1975). But Professor Smith acknowledges that "population-
based reapportionment did have some effect" in electing blacks to state legislatures, since
the increasing concentration of blacks in cities makes racial gerrymandering more difficult
under the one person-one vote rule. Id. at 674. Where there are large numbers of seats to be
reapportioned, highly concentrated minorities are more likely to obtain representation.
57 549 F. Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 809 (1983) (mem.).
58 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb-4 (1982). The Voting Rights Act requires the subject
jurisdictions to submit (or pre-clear) any proposed changes in its voting laws, practices or
procedures (including redistricting and reapportionment plans) to the United States Attor-
ney General or to the District Court for the District of Columbia. If the Attorney General
objects to any voting changes, a state may seek a declaratory judgment in the District of
Columbia federal court that the proposed changes do not invidiously discriminate against
protected minorities. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT: UNFULFILLED GOALS (Sept. 1981). See also City of Rome v. United States, 446
U.S. 156 (1980) (pre-clearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act upheld).
" "The discrimination in this case is explicit and implicit. The contradictions, illogical
justifications and feigned ignorance reflected in testimony at trial indicate an attempt to
cover-up the true motives of the Georgia General Assembly." 549 F. Supp. at 515.
60 Id. at 500.
" Id. at 501. The court ordered the state to submit a new redistricting plan within 20
days and delayed the congressional primary and general elections until the plan was subse-
quently approved by the court.
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the San Carlos Apache tribe into three congressional and three legislative
districts, thereby diluting the voting strength of the tribe."2 The Louisi-
ana redistricting plan was also overturned on grounds of diluting minority
voting strength."
In Mississippi, a court-ordered plan was implemented when the state's
plan did not survive the Attorney General's preclearance under the Vot-
ing Rights Act. " The court adopted a plan similar to the legislative plan,
with the exception that one district contained a 53.77% black majority.
Mississippi must now show that any other redistricting plan it enacts is
not retrogressive as compared to this court-ordered plan."6
The Attorney General objected to the Texas congressional districting
bill on the grounds that it diluted minority voting strength in at least two
districts." The three-judge court altered district boundaries in both the
2 Goddard v. Babbitt, 536 F. Supp. 538 (D. Ariz. 1982). The parties stipulated to
changes that returned the tribe to one district and reduced the maximum population devia-
tion from 1.4% to .075% for the congressional districts. See also Klahr v. Williams, 339
F. Supp. 922 (D. Ariz. 1972) (Arizona's reapportionment invalidated for attempting to split
Navajo Indian reservation into three legislative districts). Presumably the state will not at-
tempt to gerrymander tribes into separate districts in the next round of reapportionment.
13 Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983).
" Jordan v. Winter, 541 F. Supp. 1135 (N.D. Miss. 1982), vacated and remanded sub
nom. 103 S. Ct. 2077 (1983). In entering his objection to the state's plan, the Attorney Gen-
eral stated that "District Nos. 1, 2, and 3 have been drawn horizontally across the majority-
black Delta area in such manner as to dismember the black population concentration and
effectively dilute its voting strength." Id. at 1139 n.4.
The reapportionment battle in the Mississippi legislature has lasted 15 years. See United
States v. Mississippi, 444 U.S. 1050 (1980) (adopted 1978 legislatively enacted plan that
compared favorably with court-ordered plan); Connor v. Coleman, 425 U.S. 675 (1976) (writ
of mandamus ordering district court to develop a court-ordered plan); Connor v. Williams,
404 U.S. 549 (1972) (remanded to district court for proceedings before special master); Con-
nor v. Winter, 519 F. Supp. 1337 (S.D. Miss. 1981) (awarded attorney's fees and costs of
over $100,000); Connor v. Finch, 469 F. Supp. 693 (S.D. Miss. 1979) (adopted compromise
plan for 1979 elections); Connor v. Finch, 419 F. Supp. 1072 (S.D. Miss 1976) (adopted
court-ordered plan), rev'd 431 U.S. 407 (1977) (impermissibly high population variances in
court-ordered plan); Connor v. Waller, 396 F. Supp. 1308 (S.D. Miss.) (upheld constitution-
ality of legislature's 1975 plan), rev'd, 421 U.S. 656 (1975); Connor v. Johnson, 330 F. Supp.
521 (S.D. Miss.) (finding that drawing single-member districts is an insurmountable prob-
lem), relief denied, 403 U.S. 928 (1971); Connor v. Johnson, 330 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. Miss.)
(1971 legislative plan invalid), rev'd in part, 402 U.S. 690 (1971) (ordered single-member
districts); Connor v. Johnson, 256 F. Supp. 492 (S.D. Miss.), aff'd, 386 U.S. 483 (1967)
(court-ordered interim plan for 1967 elections).
65 The court deferred to the legislature's expressed policy of creating two 40% black
districts, rather than one 65% black district. Mississippi v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 1329
(D.D.C. 1981). Court-ordered plans are generally temporary, and may be superceded by a
validly enacted legislative plan.
6" Seamon v. Upham, 536 F. Supp. 931, 1030 (E.D. Tex.), rev'd in part, - U.S. -, 102
S. Ct. 1518 (1982). Chiding the Attorney General for objecting to the plan just three days
before the filing deadline for candidates, and 140 days after receiving the plan, the trial
court stated that "the unseemly delay, inattention and inactivity of the Office of the Attor-
ney General of the United States provided the State of Texas with anything but an expedi-
[Vol. 32:569
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol32/iss4/4
ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE
affected districts and in Dallas County, but the Supreme Court reversed,
stating that "[w]e have never said that the entry of an objection by the
Attorney General to any part of a state plan grants a district court the
authority to disregard aspects of the legislative plan not objected to by
the Attorney General. ' '67 On remand, the trial court found that since the
Texas election schedule had already started, restoring the districts drawn
by the legislature would disrupt the election process. The court also noted
that the legislature could enact a valid plan for all parts of the state after
the 1982 elections.6
8
3. Other Successful Challenges
Challenges to congressional redistricting plans were also successful in
Arkansas, Hawaii, New Jersey, Ohio and Illinois."" In Arkansas,70 the trial
court held that the state's redistricting plan containing population devia-
tions of 1.87% exceeded the limits permitted under the applicable Su-
tious mechanism for seeking approval of its congressional apportionment plan." Id. at 931
n.3.
67 _ U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. at 1518.
" 536 F. Supp. at 935. The State of Texas has seen a remarkable history of long and
expensive litigation over several reapportionment and redistricting plans: White v. Weiser,
412 U.S. 783 (1975) (upheld finding of unconstitutionality of congressional districts, but
recommended implementation of a different plan); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973)
(reversed in part lower court finding that 1972 House districts were unconstitutional); Bul-
lock v. Weiser, 404 U.S. 1065 (1971) (permitted 1972 elections to be held using unconstitu-
tional districts given closeness of scheduled elections); Weiser v. White, 505 F.2d 912 (5th
Cir. 1975); Terrazas v. Clements, 537 F. Supp. 514 (N.D. Tex. 1982); Graves v. Barnes
(Graves IV), 446 F. Supp. 560 (W.D. Tex. 1977); Graves v. Barnes (Graves III), 408
F. Supp. 1050 (W.D. Tex. 1976); Graves v. Barnes (Graves II), 378 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Tex.
1974), aff'd sub noma. Briscoe v. Escalante, 435 U.S. 901 (1978) (resolved Department of
Justice objections to Texas single-member districts drawn under Graves I); Graves v.
Barnes (Graves I), 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd sub noma. Archer v. Smith, 409 U.S.
808 (1972) (upheld constitutionality of 1972 State Senate districts); Kilgarlin v. Martin, 252
F. Supp. 404 (S.D. Tex. 1966), aff'd sub noma. Kilgarlin v. Hill, 368 U.S. 120 (1967) (declar-
ing the 1961 reapportionment invalid); Bush v. Martin (Bush II), 251 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.
Tex. 1966) (allowing 1964 congressional elections under the 1957 plan); Bush v. Martin
(Bush I), 224 F. Supp. 499 (S.D. Tex. 1963) (1957 congressional redistricting declared inva-
lid), aff'd, 376 U.S. 222 (1964) (per curiam); Clements v. Valles, 620 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. 1981)
(invalidated 1981 legislative reapportionment); Mauzy v. Legis. Redistricting Bd., 471
S.W.2d 570 (Tex. 1971) (required L.R.B. to re-draw lines after the decision in Smith v.
Craddick, 471 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. 1971)); Smith v. Craddick, 471 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. 1971) (in-
validating 1970 state House districts). See generally Bickerstaff, supra note 34.
" The successful New Jersey challenge is discussed infra text accompanying notes 129-
51. A challenge to the Illinois redistricting also was successful. See Ryan v. State Bd. of
Elections, 661 F.2d 1130 (7th Cir. 1981) (ordered convening of three-judge court to hear
challenge to Illinois congressional districts); In re Illinois Reapportionment Cases,
No. 81 C 3915 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 1981), aff'd sub noma. Ryan v. Otto, 454 U.S. 1130 (1982)
(mem.).
"0 Doulin v. White, 528 F. Supp. 1323 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
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preme Court standards.7" Because the Governor did not then call a spe-
cial session of the legislature to enact a new plan, the court implemented
a redistricting bill originally introduced in the legislature with population
variances of only 0.78%. 72
Ohio's congressional districts were invalidated because of their varia-
tion from population equality, although an initial challenge on grounds of
race discrimination was unsuccessful. A three-judge panel concluded that
"with a good-faith effort the General Assembly could have significantly
reduced" variances from equality. 3
The Hawaii plan was struck down because the state used registered
voters rather than census population figures as the population base for
redistricting Hawaii's two congressional seats. 74 The court found "unper-
suasive the state's argument that its high military population means that
use of total population for congressional redistricting would be inappro-
priate and unfair to the citizens of the state. This large military popula-
tion certainly aided the state in achieving its two congressional
districts. 75
4. Redistricting Plans Upheld
Redistricting plans survived preliminary challenges in California
7
Pennsylvania 7 7 and Ohio 7 although California redistricting opponents
were ultimately successful in overturning the plan at the polls and the
Pennsylvania plaintiffs may well succeed after the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in the New Jersey case.
79
California opponents of the redistricting plan filed petitions for a June,
71 See supra note 30.
71 Doulin v. White, 533 F. Supp. 450 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
78 Flanagan v. Gillmor, No. C-2-82-173, slip op. at 26 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 1984). The
court's order requiring the legislature to develop a new plan for the 1984 elections was
stayed on February 16, 1984. See also infra note 78 and accompanying text.
7' Travis v. King, 552 F. Supp. 554 (D. Hawaii 1982).
71 Id. at 571. The use of a registered voter base was also unconstitutional because it led
to deviations of 3.0%, a figure that was avoidable if census data were used. Id. Cf. DuBois v.
City of College Park, 283 Md. 676, 447 A.2d 838 (1982) (city analogized its exclusion of
transient students in councilinanic reapportionment base to Hawaii's now-invalid practice of
excluding its transient military population in the reapportionment base), cert. denied, -
U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 787 (1983).
" Assembly of California v. Deukmejian, 30 Cal. 3d 638, 639 P.2d 939, 180 Cal. Rptr.
297, cert. denied, 456 U.S. 941 (1982).
17 In re Pennsylvania Cong. Dist. Reapportionment Cases, 535 F. Supp. 191 (M.D. Penn.
1982).
78 The challenge to the Ohio redistricting based on race discrimination was dismissed.
See Flanagan v. Gillmor, 561 F. Supp. 36 (S.D. Ohio 1982). However the challenge on
grounds of excess population deviations was successful. See supra note 73 and accompany-
ing text.
11 Karcher v. Daggett, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2653 (1983). The New Jersey challenge is
fully discussed infra text accompanying notes 129-51.
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1982 referendum on the redistricting and reapportionment statutes.8 0 The
referendum repealing the congressional districts subsequently passed,
3,226,333 (64.6%) to 1,764,981 (35.4%), and California's congressional
districts were re-drawn by the legislature for the 1984 elections.8 1
The court denied plaintiffs' motion to delay the Pennsylvania," con-
gressional elections without addressing the constitutionality of the plan. 3
However, since the Supreme Court affirmed the invalidation of the New
Jersey plan, the Pennsylvania districts may eventually be found unconsti-
tutional on grounds of deviation from population equality. The .3993%
deviation in Pennsylvania was quite close to the .6984% deviation struck
down in New Jersey.
B. Challenges to State Legislative Districts
Challenges to state legislative districts were based on different grounds
than attacks on congressional districts. Challenges were based primarily
upon population deviations or geographic considerations, accounting for
ten challenges each. Partisan gerrymandering or racial discrimination ac-
counted for only six challenges. Surprisingly, courts were asked to break
political stalemates in only two states, Minnesota and Wisconsin. 4
80 Although the California Supreme Court placed the referendum on the ballot despite
technical objections to the petitions, the court held that since the referendum would be on
the same primary ballot as the congressional elections, the challenged districts would be
used for the 1982 elections. Assembly of California v. Deukmejian, 30 Cal. 3d 638, 639 P.2d
939, 180 Cal. Rptr. 297, cert. denied, 456 U.S. 941 (1982). See also In re Initiative Petition
No. 317, 648 P.2d 1207 (Okla. 1982) (initiative challenging Oklahoma congressional redis-
tricting placed on ballot despite technical objections to petitions).
81 One Republican assemblyman filed petitions for a referendum on these re-drawn dis-
tricts, but the California Supreme Court held that the state's long-maintained policy of de-
cennial reapportionment meant that only one initiative would be allowed per decade. USA
Today, Sept. 16, 1983, at A4.
83 In re Pennsylvania Cong. Dist. Reapportionment Cases, 535 F. Supp. 191 (M.D. Penn.
1982).
11 Significantly, the trial court relied on Justice Brennan's stay of execution order in the
New Jersey case where the population deviation was .6984%. Karcher v. Daggett, - U.S.
-, 102 S. Ct. 1298 (1983). The court reasoned that if there were a "fair prospect of rever-
sal" in the New Jersey case, then the likelihood plaintiffs would demonstrate that a .3993%
population deviation was impermissible did not outweigh the costs in delaying the congres-
sional election.
84 By comparison, note that congressional redistricting was deadlocked in five states. See
supra text accompanying notes 50-55. The difference could be that many state legislatures
either reapportion themselves or delegate this duty to a bi-partisan commission with a tie-
breaking member. For an excellent summary of state constitutional provisions for reappor-
tionment, see Note, Apportionment in North Dakota: The Saga of Continuing Controversy,
57 N.D.L. REV. 447, 472-73 nn.190-99 (1981). See infra text accompanying notes 109-28 for a
discussion of other challenges.
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1. Population Deviations
Reapportionment in Round III bore out Justice Brennan's observation
in White v. Regesters8 that a line for the acceptability of deviations in
state legislative reapportionment had apparently been drawn at 10%.
Lower courts in Round III held plans with deviations lower than that
figure valid and generally invalidated plans with deviations greater than
10%. Plaintiffs successfully challenged population deviations of 94% in
New Mexico,"6 88% in Rhode Island,8 7 26.3% in Virginia,"' and devia-
tions of 43.18% (Senate) and 16.04% (House) that resulted from Hawaii's
use of registered voters rather than total population for its reapportion-
ment base.8s
In addition, a Michigan formula which used both area and population
was struck down, although the plan subsequently drawn by a special
master created population deviations of 16.26% (House) and 16.36%
(Senate).9 0
85 412 U.S. 755, 777 (1973). See supra note 37.
" Sanchez v. King, 550 F. Supp. 13 (D.N.M.), aff'd, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 32 (1982)
(mem.). New Mexico constructed legislative districts by combining election precincts. Be-
cause these precincts crossed census block and enumeration district lines, the state then
computed the population of these precincts on a "total votes cast" formula which yielded
impermissibly high population deviations.
'7 Farnum v. Burns, 548 F. Supp. 769 (D.R.I. 1982). The Rhode Island Supreme Court,
in Licht v. Quattrochi, 82-0259 (R.I. July 7, 1982), struck down the 1982 legislative plan,
leaving the previous 1974 reapportionment in place. However, the 1980 census showed that
the 1974 districts had a maximum population deviation of 88%. The district court enjoined
the 1982 elections "until such time as a constitutionally permissible apportionment plan is
devised." 548 F. Supp. at 775.
" Cosner v. Dalton, 522 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Va. 1981). The Virginia plan used "floater"
districts. An additional legislative seat is created that "floats" over two or more underlying
districts so as to equalize the district populations. The population deviations of floater dis-
tricts can be computed either by the "traditional House" method, which computes devia-
tions by considering the floater district as a whole, or by the "shared floater" method, where
deviations are measured for each underlying district individually. The "traditional House"
method yielded a population deviation of 26.63%. The "shared floater" method yielded a
population deviation of 27.72%. The re-drawn plan survived challenges based on geographic
considerations. See infra text accompanying notes 96-104.
For an excellent discussioii of Cosner, see Parker, The Virginia Legislative Reapportion-
ment Case: Reapportionment Issues of the 1980's, 5 GEO. MASON U.L. REV. 1 (1982); Note,
The Reapportionment Dilemma: Lessons from the "Virginia Experience," 68 VA. L. REv.
541 (1982).
'9 Travis v. King, 552 F. Supp. 1200 (D. Hawaii 1982).
10 In re Apportionment of State Legislature, 413 Mich. 149, 207, 321 N.W.2d 565, 609
(1982) (supplemental case discussing special master's report). The court held that the inva-
lid formula which weighted land area as 20% of the formula was "inextricably linked" with
the reapportionment commission's functions. Thus, when the formula fell, the commission
could not survive. 413 Mich. 96, 138, 321 N.W.2d 565, 582, appeal dismissed sub nom.
Kleiner v. Sanderson, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 201 (1982).
See Barber, Partisan Bias and Incumbent Protection in Legislative Redistricting (Sept. 1,
1983) (unpublished manuscript): "The Commission had never in its 19 years of existence
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Reapportionment plans with smaller population deviations survived
challenges. Population deviations upheld as constitutional were 13.74% in
New Hampshire,"' 10.94% in Montana,12 8.36% in Connecticut," 5.34%
in Oregon,9 4 and 2.81% in Pennsylvania. 5
2. Geographic Considerations
Many states have constitutional or statutory requirements setting forth
geographic considerations to be followed in reapportionment, such as
compactness requirements or prohibitions against splitting political sub-
division boundaries with district lines.9 6 Courts can evaluate reapportion-
ment plans on these objective criteria. Therefore authorities seem to ad-
here closely to the standards so that their efforts will not be invalidated.
Challenges on grounds of violating geographic considerations were suc-
cessful only in Alaska, Idaho and Illinois.
While the Alaska challengers were not successful in attacking the
state's exclusion of non-resident military personnel and their dependents
from the apportionment base,97 they were able to convince the Alaska
Supreme Court that the Governor erred in drawing district boundaries.9 8
performed its function." Id. at 21.
The Michigan experience lends credence to another of Justice Brennan's warnings: "[t]o
consider a certain range of variances de minimis would encourage legislators to strive for
that range rather than for equality." Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969). The
Michigan state legislative district variances are too close to the 16% variance approved by
the Court in Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973), to be merely coincidental. Michigan's
congressional districts, on the other hand, have achieved precise equality. The districts vary
by only one person. If the state's population was evenly divisible by the number of districts
there would be no variation at all.
" Bayer v. Gardner, 540 F. Supp. 624 (D.N.H. 1982). New Hampshire's House of Repre-
sentatives, the largest in the nation at 400 members, are elected from "floterial" districts, in
which some districts elect more than one member so as to equalize population differences.
The deviations in New Hampshire came about because the state did not cross county
boundaries in drawing the districts. This method won the court's approval, however, be-
cause the State Representatives in each county comprise the County Convention, the legis-
lative body for New Hampshire's counties. Id. at 630 n.10.
" McBride v. Mahoney, 573 F. Supp. 913 (D. Mont. 1983).
" Logan v. O'Neill, 187 Conn. 721, 448 A.2d 1306 (1982).
McCall v. Legislative Assembly, 219 Or. 663, 634 P.2d 223 (1981).
" In re Apportionment Plan for Pennsylvania Gen. Assembly, 497 Pa. 425, 442 A.2d 661
(1981). The largest deviation among the plans upheld was in Wyoming (89%). See infra text
accompanying notes 152-63.
" Constitutional or statutory provisions include requirements of contiguity (31 states),
compactness (23 states) and original jurisdiction over the validity of reapportionment plans
vested in the highest court of the state (16 states). See Dodge & McCauley, supra note 6, at
546-47 n.95.
" See infra text accompanying notes 109-28.
" Carpenter v. Hammond, No. 6728 (Alaska July 22, 1983). The Alaska Constitution
provides that districts "shall be formed of contiguous and compact territory containing as
nearly as practicable a relatively integrated socio-economic area." Id. slip op. at 27 (citing
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The court found that one community was improperly included in a dis-
trict where there was no "significant social and economic interaction" be-
tween the various communities."
In Idaho the state supreme court'00 upheld the trial court's determina-
tion that the reapportionment plan violated the state's constitutional pro-
hibition against splitting county boundaries. The trial court then "dra-
matically" reshaped the districts and increased the number of Senators
and Representatives in order to reduce the population deviations that
would result from a plan which kept county boundaries intact."'0
In only one state was a plan altered solely because it violated the rule
of compactness. In Illinois, the state supreme court re-drew boundaries
for a senate district that stretched 125 miles, 102 a violation of the com-
pactness provisions of the Illinois Constitution.
Other challenges based on compactness or splitting political sub-divi-
sions were unsuccessful. The Arkansas challenge'0 3 to a plan that split
counties was defeated because the Board of Apportionment split county
lines so as to achieve population equality among the districts. Similarly,
in Connecticut, plaintiffs challenging the state's plan as violating the
"town integrity" principle of the state constitution were not successful
despite presenting a plan that contained lower deviations than the state
plan.1
0 4
3. Gerrymandering and Racial Discrimination
The Arizona and Illinois challenges were the only reapportionment
cases to alter a plan on grounds of racial gerrymandering. Arizona's plan
failed to win approval of the Attorney General under the Voting Rights
ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 6).
9 Id. slip op. at 32. Several Vermont towns challenged the state's reapportionment on
similar grounds but the case was dismissed by the Vermont Supreme Court. Challenges to
Districts Dismissed, Rutland Daily Herald, Aug. 19, 1982, at 1.
1o Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 104 Idaho 858, 664 P.2d 765 (1983).
101 Judge reshaped Idaho's political boundaries, Lewiston Morning Tribune, Aug. 21,
1983, at 1A.
102 Schrage v. State Bd. of Elections, 88 Ill. 2d 87, 430 N.E.2d 483 (1981). A federal court
challenge on grounds of non-compliance with geographic standards was unsuccessful. How-
ever, the plaintiff succeeded on grounds of dilution of minority voting strength in the Chi-
cago area. The court adopted a settlement agreement, re-drawing boundaries in the Chicago
area. Rybicki v. State Bd. of Elections, 574 F. Supp. 1082, 1147, 1161 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
"' Wells v. White, 274 Ark. 197, 623 S.W.2d 187 (1981).
104 Logan v. O'Neill, 187 Conn. 721, 448 A.2d 1306 (1982). See also Cline v. Robb, 548
F. Supp. 128 (E.D. Va. 1982) (approved re-drawn districts over objections to the split-up of
county boundaries); In re Reapportionment of Colorado Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d 191 (Colo.
1982) (approved commission's split of county lines in 1982 reapportionment, but revised
apportionment on other grounds). Challenges regarding compactness were also unsuccessful
in New York and Florida. See In re Apportionment Law, 414 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 1982); Bay
Ridge Community Council v. Carey, 115 Misc. 2d 433, 454 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1982).
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Act, since it divided the San Carlos Apache tribe (population 8,000) into
three congressional and three legislative districts, thereby diluting the
voting strength of the tribe.1 °5
Challenges alleging unconstitutional gerrymandering were defeated on
procedural grounds, as in Arkansas,' for lack of proof of discriminatory
intent, as in Florida and Virginia, °7 or for raising a "non-justiciable is-
sue," as in New York.108
4. Other Challenges
a. Exclusion of Non-residents
The presence of large numbers of non-residents in their respective
states led Alaska and Hawaii to exclude non-residents from the appor-
tionment base. Alaska did so in a more methodical and constitutionally
acceptable manner.1 09 The Alaska Supreme Court held that the exclusion
of non-resident military members and dependents did not violate the
equal protection guarantee. °10
10 Goddard v. Babbitt, 536 F. Supp. 538, 543 (D. Ariz. 1982). The parties stipulated to
changes that returned the tribe to one district. See also Klahr v. Williams, 399 F. Supp. 922
(D. Ariz. 1972) (invalidated attempt to split Navajo reservation into three legislative dis-
tricts). The Illinois challenge was also successful. See supra note 102.
1 Arkansas plaintiffs were unsuccessful because their challenge went to the composition
of only one of the state's 35 state senatorial districts, and did not challenge the entire plan
as required under state law. Bizzell v. White, 279 Ark. 511, 625 S.W.2d 528 (1981).
107 Florida plaintiffs were successful in overturning the state senatorial election schedule
but did not succeed in challenging the plan on racial or partisan gerrymandering grounds.
See infra note 113. The plaintiffs did not show a "purposefully discriminatory dilution...
of freedom to vote." In re Apportionment Law, 414 So. 2d 1040, 1052 (Fla. 1982). Accord,
Cosner v. Dalton, 522 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Va. 1981). The plan "affirmatively shows provi-
sions which will substantially increase the opportunity for minority participation in the po-
litical processes .. " 414 So. 2d at 1052. One of the districts "challenged for dilution of
Hispanic population is sixty percent Hispanic." Id. at 1052 n.8.
The New York plan was challenged for violating the requirements of compact, contig-
uous and convenient districts, but the New York trial court held that plaintiffs raised a
"non-justiciable issue" in alleging a partisan gerrymander. Bay Ridge Community Council v.
Carey, 115 Misc. 2d 433, 437, 454 N.Y.S.2d 186, 191 (1982). As a current version of the
"political thicket," the New York court suggested that invalidating reapportionments for
partisan gerrymandering would require courts to "enter a hopeless morass." Id.
.o The state surveyed a sample of military personnel in the state. Respondents who an-
swered that they were registered to vote in Alaska, considered Alaska their home, or in-
tended to make Alaska their home were considered residents. The results of the survey
determined "non-resident population coefficients" for the areas surrounding military bases,
accounting for 7.83% of the state's population. Carpenter v. Hammond, No. 6728, slip op.
at 4-7 (Alaska July 22, 1983).
"' "We think it clear that a state has a legitimate interest in limiting its apportionment
base to bona fide residents." Id. slip op. at 24. The court relied upon its analysis of the
state's policy eight years before in Groh v. Egan, 526 P.2d 863 (Alaska 1974), where the
court held that the state's policy of excluding military transients was "not offensive to no-
tions of equal protection" as a "rational state policy." Id. at 25.
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On the other hand, the Hawaii plan was struck down because of the use
of registered voters rather than census population figures as the popula-
tion base for reapportionment. 1 ' Hawaii did not meet the standard of
showing a close approximation of the reapportionment plan to one using
total population, because the plan contained population deviations of up
to 43.18%, and was thus invalid.
b. Staggered Elections
The scheduling of staggered senatorial elections was a significant issue
in challenges in several states that elect half of the Senate every two
years. Half of the senatorial seats are filled by incumbents elected in dis-
tricts that are no longer equal in population after the results of the de-
cennial census, despite the fact that they were originally elected to four-
year terms from validly apportioned districts. Courts in Colorado,"1 2 Flor-
ida,1 s and Oregon '" 4 redesigned plans to avoid such a dilemma. However
the Wisconsin court reached an opposite result."5 Legislatures can re-
.. Travis v. King, 552 F. Supp. 554 (D. Hawaii 1982). During Round I, the Supreme
Court held in Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1965), that while Hawaii could not use
registered voters as the intended apportionment base, the state could use a registered voter
base if it "produced a distribution of legislators not substantially different from that which
would have resulted from the use of a permissible population base." Id. at 93.
11 The Colorado Supreme Court objected to the schedule for senatorial elections where
two incumbent senators lived in one district and no senators lived in an adjacent district as
violating "constitutional guarantees of legislative representation." In re Reapportionment of
Colorado Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d 191, 198 (Colo. 1982). This schedule also violated consti-
tutional provisions for recall of senators, as the senator assigned to the district would have
no identifiable constituency. Id. at 199.
Upon review of the plan developed by the Reapportionment Commission on remand, the
court concluded that the commission "substantially re-drew boundaries" and the new
boundaries violated the Colorado constitutional requirement of compactness and keeping
intact communities of interest. Id. at 210.
.. The Florida Supreme Court held that "since the geographic boundaries of all senate
districts have been changed by this [1982] apportionment plan then elections must be held
in 1982 for all senate districts." In re Apportionment Law, 414 So. 2d 1040, 1045 (Fla.
1982). The court examined Florida's extensive history of reapportionment litigation and
concluded that truncated terms for Senators were "vary familiar" to the 1967 legislature
that framed the reapportioninent rules in the wake of the Florida litigation. Id. at 1049. For
examples of Florida's previous reapportionment litigation, see Swann v. Adams (Swann V),
263 F. Supp. 225 (S.D. Fla. 1967); Swann v. Adams (Swann IV), 258 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.
Fla.), rev'd, 385 U.S. 440 (1965); Swann v. Adams (Swann III), 258 F. Supp. 819 (S.D. Fla.),
rev'd, 383 U.S. 210 (1965); Swann v. Adams (Swann II), 214 F. Supp. 811 (S.D. Fla.), rev'd,
378 U.S. 553 (1963); Swann.v. Adams (Swann I), 208 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1962).
"4 The Oregon reapportionment plan was invalid for failing to assign an identifiable sen-
ator to a district that would not have had a senatorial election from 1978 to 1982. See Mc-
Call v. Legislative Assembly, 291 Or. 663, 634 P.2d 223 (1981). The plan as amended was
subsequently approved. See Cargo v. Paulus, 291 Or. 772, 635 P.2d 367 (1981).
'" Wisconsin State AFL-CIO v. Elections Bd., 543 F. Supp. 630 (E.D. Wis. 1982). A
three-judge federal panel rejected Democratic plaintiffs' challenge to a court-ordered plan
providing for some State Senate districts where no election would be held until 1984. Plain-
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solve this problem by adopting truncated terms for one-half of the senate
districts, or by electing all of the Senators at the same time.
c. Reapportionment Deadlocks
Deadlocks in the political process resulted in court-ordered reappor-
tionment plans in Wisconsin and Minnesota. Following the failure of the
Minnesota legislature to adopt a reapportionment plan, a three-judge fed-
eral court implemented its own reapportionment scheme. The standards
used by the court in developing its plan included that "all districts be
single-member, be compact, be contiguous, preserve the voting strength
of minority populations, respect boundaries of political subdivisions, and
contain a given degree of population equality." '
However, the concurring judge pointed out that following the initial
drawing of the boundaries the court noted the residence of incumbents
and made minor adjustments in a number of districts to preserve "politi-
cal fairness" and permit continued constituency-legislator relations. He
believed that "any use of incumbent residency was inappropriate under
the circumstances." '1 7
tiffs' contention, the court stated, "is a house of cards that collapses when exposed to even
the gentlest breeze of cursory analysis," since each district would have an identifiable sena-
tor during the two years when half the Senate was elected under the 1972 districts. Id. at
659.
The Wisconsin case arose out of the legislature's inability to adopt a reapportionment
plan that would survive the Governor's veto. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that
the 1972 legislative boundaries were unconstitutional after the 1980 census. The plaintiffs
also asked for the imposition of a court-ordered plan. Id. at 672.
The existing 1972 boundaries yielded, according to the 1980 census, impermissible popula-
tion deviations of 49.8% for the State Senate and 62.4% for the State House. The 1980 plan
adopted by the legislature (but vetoed by the Governor) contained deviations of 6.02%, but
the court held that "after reviewing [the legislative plan], we conclude that it is one of the
worst efforts before us and . . . has no redeeming value." Id. at 637.
Plans submitted by Democratic plaintiffs and Republican intervenors ranged in popula-
tion deviations from 2.83% to 10.11%. The court recognized that the Wisconsin Constitu-
tion called for "compact and contiguous" districts, but held that "[a]lthough important, the
requirement of compactness is clearly subservient to the overall goal of population equal-
ity." Id. at 634.
Since none of the plans submitted by the parties adhered to the objective of population
equality and compactness, the court drew its own plan. The court attempted to preserve
county boundaries and developed a plan with a population deviation of 1.74%. Id. at 637.
The court did not consider partisan advantage. "At no time in the drawing of this plan did
we consider where any incumbent legislator resides or whether our plan would inure to the
political benefit of any one person or party." Id. at 638. Ohio, for example, uses a system
which "phases in" the new senate districts. The Board responsible for reapportionment as-
signs half of the incumbent senators to the districts not coming up for election. OHIO CONST.
art. XI, § 12.
" LaComb v. Growe, 541 F. Supp. 160, 167 (D. Minn. 1982). For a discussion of the
deadlock in Wisconsin, see supra note 115.
"' 541 F. Supp. at 167.
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d. Multi-member Districts
In South Dakota, plaintiffs challenged reapportionment claiming that
creation of several multi-member districts diluted the voting strength of
single-member district voters. " s In granting the state's motion for sum-
mary judgment " the court relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in
Forston v. Dorsey,' where Georgia plaintiffs unsuccessfully challenged
the state's policy of electing Senators from multi-member districts in the
state's seven most populous counties as diluting the votes of the multi-
member district voters.
e. Attorney General Objections
Late objections by the United States Attorney General to plans in two
states led the respective district courts to implement plans not unlike the
ones objected to by the Attorney General. In Alabama, the Attorney Gen-
eral approved reapportionment for sixty of the state's sixty-seven coun-
ties, but stated that evaluation could not be completed for the remaining
counties in the limited time before the election season began. 2'
Plaintiffs and defendants were asked to provide proposed modifications
to the legislature's plan, but the court later concluded that it too did not
have enough time to consider the modifications. 22 Instead, the court ac-
cepted modifications for one county as suggested by the plaintiffs, and
ordered interim implementation of the rest of the legislative
enactment.
1 28
"8 O'Connor v. Kundert, No. 81-41-05 (D.S.D. Feb. 12, 1982).
"" Id. slip op. at 2.
1"0 379 U.S. 433 (1965). The Court held that creation of some multi-member districts did
not violate equal protection per se, but did not specifically address the question of vote
dilution in single-member districts. Id. at 438-39. Accord City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S.
55, 65 (1980). Multi-member district plaintiffs maintained that their votes are diluted be-
cause while they might be able to elect a representative in a single-member district, when
outnumbered by voters from other parts of the multi-member district, it is mathematically
impossible to elect their own representative. Single-member district voters contended that
their votes are diluted because they can elect only one representative, while multi-member
district voters can elect several representatives. Single-member district voters would argue
that the multi-member district voters are the constituents of several legislators and there-
fore wield significantly more power in the legislative process. On the other hand, multi-
member district plaintiffs have charged that because minority groups represent a much
smaller part of the multi-member district population a legislator can politically afford to be
insensitive to the needs of the minority. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, - U.S. __, 102 S. Ct.
3272 (1982).
... Burton v. Hobbie, 543 F. Supp. 235, 237 (M.D. Ala. 1982), aff'd, - U.S. -, 102
S. Ct. 286 (1982) (mem.).
I'l "This Court is unwilling to impose a modification on the legislative plan . . . which
would require the Court to ignore the approved legislative enactment in some twenty-six
counties" since modifications in the objectionable districts would have a ripple effect in
adjoining counties. 543 F. Supp. at 237.
123 Id. at 239.
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The case in Texas was quite similar to Alabama's challenge. The 1981
Texas legislative reapportionment did not survive either the legislative
process or pre-clearance approval by the Attorney General. The Senate
reapportionment was vetoed by the Governor, and the House reappor-
tionment bill was objected to by the Attorney General. In Texas, when no
legislatively enacted plan is in effect, the reapportionment is done by the
Legislative Reapportionment Board (L.R.B.), consisting of five state
officeholders. 2 '
The Department of Justice entered objections to portions of the L.R.B.
plan, although it later withdrew many of these objections. Plaintiffs then
filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the L.R.B. plan was
unconstitutional and a court-ordered reapportionment plan in time for
the 1982 Texas elections.12 5
The three-judge federal court adopted the L.R.B. plan with some modi-
fications proposed by hispanic plaintiffs. Because no plan had achieved
pre-clearance approval from the Department of Justice, the court per-
ceived its role as quite limited:
Our job is to fill the legal hiatus . . . in a situation in which there
has been no adjudication by any court that the LRB plans are in
any respect constitutionally infirm and in which the great major-
ity of the Senate and House districts provided for by those plans
have, as a practical matter, been pre-cleared under the Voting
Rights Act.126
Thus, despite the Attorney General's objections, reapportionment plans
were given at least temporary effect in two states. In order to avoid the
use of objectionable reapportionment plans in the future, states should
submit plans to the Justice Department in a timely manner. The Attor-
ney General should also streamline evaluation procedures.
C. The Supreme Court Enters Round III
The United States Supreme Court entered Round III with Karcher v.
Daggett, 27 invalidating New Jersey's congressional districts, and Brown
124 Terrazas v. Clements, 537 F. Supp. 514, 517 n.1 (N.D. Tex. 1982). After extensive pub-
lic hearings the L.R.B. adopted a reapportionment plan for both Houses of the legislature.
Attorney General Mark White transmitted the plan to the Department of Justice with his
conclusions that the plan violated neither the Constitution nor the Voting Rights Act. How-
ever, the Secretary of State also sent the plan to the Department of Justice, but with his
comment that the plan had received some merited objections. Id. at 520. Partisan politics no
doubt played a role in the two letters to the Justice Department. The Secretary of State was
a Republican appointed by then-Governor Clements. Clements was defeated for re-election
by Attorney General White, a Democrat.
125 Terrazas v. Clements, 537 F. Supp. 514 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
120 Id. at 548.
127 - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2653 (1983).
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v. Thomson, 2 s upholding Wyoming's legislative districts. Decided on the
same day, these decisions have not answered the remaining issues of the
one person-one vote rule. These decisions do, however, indicate that there
will no doubt be a Round IV as legislators and lower federal courts con-
tinue to struggle with the implementation of one person-one vote. Both
cases were decided by a five to four vote. Justice O'Connor voted in
Karcher to invalidate New Jersey's congressional districts, but voted with
the Karcher minority to uphold Wyoming's legislative districts in Brown.
Justice Stevens' concurrence and Justice Powell's dissent in Karcher,
noteworthy for the questions of gerrymandering they raise, also help to
muddy the redistricting waters.
1. Karcher v. Daggett
In the New Jersey case192 the legislature enacted" a redistricting
plan"" containing a raw total deviation of 3,764 persons, or .6984% of the
target district." 2
The district court held that the .6984% population deviation "was not
unavoidable,"' " and not a good faith effort"4 to achieve population
equality. The court also rejected the state's contention that the equal
population standard is satisfied "when the population variation is less
than the statistical imprecision of the Census.'3
118 - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2690 (1983).
11 At the district court, Daggett v. Kimmelman, 535 F. Supp. 978 (D.N.J. 1982).
ISo The 199th legislature passed two redistricting bills. The first was vetoed by the Gover-
nor, and the second was repealed by the 200th legislature and replaced by the plan that was
challenged. - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. at 2657. Assemblyman Jackman was the Speaker of the
199th legislature and Assemblyman Karcher is the Speaker of the 200th legislature.
"' Democratic Governor Brendan Byrne signed the reapportionment bill on the day that
he left office and shortly before his Republican successor assumed the position.
132 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS OF THE
98TH CONG. (pre-publication tables) (1982). A plan developed by Professor Ernest Roeck of
Rutgers University containing deviations of .3250% had been introduced, and other plans
with deviations from .0923% to .4515% were also under consideration. Daggett v. Kim-
melman, 535 F. Supp. 978, 982 (D.N.J. 1982). The Roeck plan evoked what one of the dis-
trict court judges called a "remarkable" letter from Speaker Jackman. According to Jack-
man, Roeck's plan was "little more than an academic statement of your views of the desired
outcome." Disavowing use of "scientifically developed blueprints," Jackman noted that "es-
tablishing standards for redistricting without recognition of the political process may deny
the very real political nature of apportionment." Id. at 983.
193 535 F. Supp. at 983.
Compare Flanagan v. Gillmor, No. C-2-82-173, slip op. at 13 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 1984)
("good faith" is a term of art in congressional redistricting cases).
18 535 F. Supp. at 983. Although there was some evidence that the New Jersey legisla-
ture intended to avoid diluting minority voting strength, the district court held that there
was no causal relationship between this goal and the population deviations of the plan, since
the districts with a high minority population were the districts containing the high devia-
tions. Id.
Judge Gibbons, the dissenter in the district court, noted that while the blatant partisan-
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On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Brennan, writing for the ma-
jority,1 " rejected the state's argument that the variances did not exceed a
de minimis level. "[T]here are no de minimis populations, which could
practicably be avoided, but which nonetheless meet the standard of
Art. I, § 2 without justification. 1 3 7 Argument that the plan was accept-
able because its deviations did not exceed the "inevitable statistical im-
precision of census figures" 13 8 was "little more than an attempt to present
an attractive de minimis line with a patina of scientific authority. ' 39
The availability of other plans with lower deviations meant only that
the burden of proof shifted to the state to prove that the deviations were
necessary to achieve some legitimate state objective'1 4 0 a burden that New
Jersey failed to meet. The only justification advanced by the state in-
volved the protection of minority voting strength, and the Court was con-
vinced that the trial court did not err in finding that there was no causal
relationship between this interest and the deviations of the reapportion-
ment plan. 14
2. Equal Protection and Gerrymandering: Stevens and Powell
Rather than grounding the decision in Karcher on Article I, section 2,
Justice Stevens believed that the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment protected the voting strength of both racial minorities
and cognizable political groups, and he developed valid standards for de-
termining when such fourteenth amendment rights have been violated.
Noting that the equal protection clause has been used to provide protec-
tion against diluting minority voting rights, Justice Stevens stated that
"as long as it proscribes gerrymandering against such groups, its proscrip-
tion must provide comparable protection for other cognizable groups of
voters as well. . . . Judicial preoccupation with the goal of perfect popu-
ship of the New Jersey redistricting "leaves me, as a citizen of New Jersey, disturbed, ...
none of my concerns as a citizen are relevant to the standards I must apply as a judge." Id.
at 985. He asserted that the population deviations in the New Jersey plan did not exceed de
minimis levels since there was no showing of illegal discrimination. "Republican members of
the House of Representatives are not, at least to date, considered to be members of a dis-
crete and insular minority." Id.
130 Joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and O'Connor.
-37 _ U.S. 
_, 103 S. Ct. at 2660.
"" See, e.g., Young v. Klutznick, 497 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Mich. 1980), rev'd, 652 F.2d 617
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1981).
139 - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. at 2661.
140 Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2663-65. "Any number of consistently applied legislative poli-
cies might justify some variance, including, for instance, making districts compact, respect-
ing municipal boundaries" and even some partisan political considerations, according to
Justice Brennan. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2663. Given the invalidation of relatively small
variances, however, it is difficult to see how any deviations can be justified. The question of
how large a deviation may be justified remains unanswered.
141 Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2664.
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lation equality is an inadequate method of judging the constitutionality
of an apportionment plan.
142
"A significant adverse impact upon a defined political group," accord-
ing to Justice Stevens, would shift the task of justification of a gerryman-
der to the state. Plaintiffs must first prove that they belonged to a "polit-
ically salient class . . . and that in the relevant district or districts or in
the State as a whole, their proportionate voting influence has been ad-
versely affected by the challenged scheme. 1 43
Plaintiffs could establish the unconstitutionality of a gerrymander in at
least four ways. First, the presence of population inequalities would be
sufficient to establish gerrymandering. Second, irregular district shapes
would require the state to explain its departure from district compact-
ness. Third, splitting established political boundaries could be another
basis for making a prima facie showing of gerrymandering. Finally, Jus-
tice Stevens also offered a procedural standard:
If the process for formulating and adopting a plan excluded diver-
gent viewpoints, openly reflected the use of partisan criteria, and
provided no explanation of the reasons for selecting one plan over
another it would seem appropriate to conclude that the adversely
affected plaintiff group is entitled to have the majority explain its
action.14
4
Justice White1 45 in dissent construed the Court's decision as an "unrea-
sonable insistence on an unattainable perfection in the equalizing of con-
gressional districts." 4 Justice White believes that a "more sensible ap-
proach" would be to adopt the less restrictive approach used in state
142 Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2670 (Stevens, J., concurring).
143 Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2672. See also Engstrom, The Supreme Court and Equipopu-
lous Gerrymandering: A Remaining Obstacle in the Quest for Fair and Effective Represen-
tation, 1976 ARIz. ST. L.J. 277 (1976).
144 - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2674. Justice Stevens believed that these standards were
met in the New Jersey case. The New Jersey plan produced districts of "uncouth and bi-
zarre" shapes and "wantonly disregard[ed] county boundaries." Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at
2676. Furthermore, the plan was designed by the Democratic legislative majority and signed
into law one day before the inauguration of a Republican Governor. What Judge Gibbons
called the "harshly partisan tone" of Speaker Jackman's letter characterized the entire re-
apportionment process and apparently would be a prima facie showing of unconstitutional
gerrymandering under Justice Stevens' procedural standard. Id.
", Joined by The Chief Justice and Justices Powell and Rehnquist.
14- - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2678 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White viewed devia-
tions below one percent as statistically insignificant because such deviations fall below the
level of precision of the census and are overcome by the variances between districts in the
number of eligible voters, eligible voters who actually register, and the number of registered
voters who actually vote. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2681. See supra note 44. However, mathe-
matical perfection has been achieved in Michigan. See supra note 90. Advances in computer
technology now places perfection within reach of most states. See, e.g., Engstrom, supra
note 5.
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legislative reapportionment cases. Although "not wedded to a precise fig-
ure . . . a 5% cutoff appear[ed] reasonable" to Justice White.147
Justice Powell, while joining the dissent as to population deviations,
was "prepared to entertain constitutional challenges to partisan gerry-
mandering that reache[d] the level of discrimination described by Justice
Stevens." 4" Thus, four Justices 9 agreed that New Jersey's population
deviated from de minimis standards. Two Justices' would entertain ger-
rymandering challenges, and three Justices 1 5 would hold that population
deviations of less than .7% do not exceed de minimis standards. It is
clear from Karcher that even de minimis deviations from equality will be
struck down. However, the Court has deferred discussion of what devia-
tions may be justified, whether a total population base makes sense using
admittedly imperfect census data, and issues of gerrymandering, to an-
other round of one person-one vote cases.
3. Brown v. Thomson
Brown v. Thomson, 52 decided the same day as Karcher, dealt with the
1981 apportionment of Wyoming's House of Representatives. Wyoming
has traditionally allocated at least one Representative to each of its
twenty-eight counties. This scheme gave Niobara County, the state's
smallest, one Representative even though its population of 2,924 was less
than half of the target population of 7,337 persons per district.
Chief Justice Burger, Justices Rehnquist, Stevens and O'Connor joined
Justice Powell's opinion upholding the constitutionality of the Wyoming
reapportionment plan. Two factors accounted for the majority's decision.
First, Wyoming's policy of granting at least one Representative per
county was applied in a manner "free from any taint of arbitrariness or
discrimination,"' 5 3 since it had been followed for years and applied con-
sistently throughout the state.14
7 - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2686.
18 Id. at __, 103 S. Ct. at 2689.
14 Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall and O'Connor.
150 Justices Stevens and Powell.
"' Justices Burger, White and Rehnquist. On remand New Jersey was unable to adopt a
new redistricting plan by the district court's deadline, so the 3-judge panel ordered imple-
mentation of a new plan for the 1984 congressional elections with a maximum deviation of
only 25 persons. Moreover, the court-ordered districts were more compact than the earlier
legislative plan, and altered districts apparently gerrymandered in favor of Democratic in-
cumbents. The Supreme Court denied an application for a stay in a memorandum opinion,
with Justice Stevens concurring and Justice Brennan, joined by Justice White and Marshall,
dissenting. Karcher v. Daggett, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1692 (1984).
1 -- U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2690 (1983).
'8' Id. at __, 103 S. Ct. at 2696 (quoting Roman v. Sinock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964)).
164 "In short, this case presents an unusually strong example of an apportionment plan
the population variations of which are entirely the result of the consistent and nondiscrimi-
natory application of a legitimate state policy." Id. at __, 103 S. Ct. at 2697.
1983-84]
31Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1984
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
The Court used mathematical legerdemain to conclude that the issue in
Brown was not the 89% maximum deviation of the Wyoming plan with
the additional district given to Niobara County, but rather "whether Wy-
oming's policy of preserving county boundaries justified the additional
deviations from population equality" '1 55 of 23%. This figure represents
the difference between a plan with a Niobara County district and a plan
without the additional district for Niobara County.1 56
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion made explicit this distinction
between the 89% total deviation in Wyoming and the 23% additional
deviation caused by the grant of a seat to Niobara County. Justice
O'Connor found this 23% figure within the "flexibility in assessing the
size of the deviation against the importance, consistency, and neutrality
of the state policies alleged to require the population disparities. '15 7 How-
ever, Justice O'Connor expressed "the gravest doubts that a statewide
legislative plan with an 89% maximum deviation could survive constitu-
tional scrutiny."158
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion stated that the Court's opinion
was "empty of likely precedental value,"159 because it focused only on the
marginal effect of the Niobara County representative, and not at the
whole Wyoming reapportionment plan.16 0 Justice Brennan and the other
dissenters 61 would have found the Wyoming plan unconstitutional re-
gardless of the Niobara County Representative or the large deviations in
the rest of the apportionment plan. 6" Justice Brennan concluded by not-
ing that while Justice O'Connor had "grave doubts" of the constitutional-
ity of a plan with an 89% maximum deviation, "the Court today holds
that just such a plan does survive constitutional scrutiny."16'
165 Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2698.
'" The Court concluded that Wyoming did not violate the fourteenth amendment in per-
mitting Niobara County to have its own representative because "the grant of a representa-
tive to Niobara County [was] not a significant cause of the population deviations . Id.
15 Id. at -' 103 S. Ct. at 2699 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'" Id. at -' 103 S. Ct. at 2700.
15 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
160 Justice Brennan observed that "at least plaintiffs will henceforth know better than to
exercise moderation or restraint in mounting constitutional attacks on state apportionment
statutes, lest they forfeit their small claim by omitting to assert a big one .... This Court is
not bound by a referendum of the League of Women Voters." Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2700,
2705.
"I1 Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun also comprised part of the majority in
Karcher.
1 - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2701. Justice Brennan noted that even the 16% average
deviation in the plan exceeded deviations struck down in other apportionment cases. Id. See
supra text accompanying notes 9-43.
"I - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2705.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: REMAINING ISSUES AND
SOLUTIONS
Round III of redistricting and reapportionment settled few of the re-
maining questions about the standards of the one person-one vote rule.
The appropriateness of precise equality of population in congressional re-
districting is a significant but apparently unresolved question. The issue
of the size and content of acceptable justifications for population devia-
tions also remains unresolved. Miscellaneous problems remain, but are
overshadowed by the issue of equipopulous gerrymandering, an issue that
the Supreme Court has left for the next round of redisticting and
reapportionment.
A. Precise Population Equality and Deviations
The goal of one person-one vote cases was to make one person's vote in
an election equal to another's, but there are a number of problems associ-
ated with using precise population equality as the standard for achieving
this goal. First, the mathematics of apportioning'" seats in the House of
Representatives to the states indicate that the standard in congressional
elections is that one person's vote is worth 65 the same as another's in
'" For an interesting discussion of the problems of apportioning whole numbers among
states when population entitles a state to a fraction of a Representative, see
L. SCHMECKEBEIR, CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT (1976).
" Table 2 indicates the distribution of the "target" or mean population of congressional
districts by size of each state's population. As population size increases, the target popula-
tion for the states moves closer together. This distribution, which looks more like an oil can
than the "normal" bell-shaped curve, is described as a leptokurtic curve. D. HARNErr, IN-
TRODUCTION TO STATISTICAL METHODS 101-02 (1970).
Although the Constitution's guarantee of one representative per state leads to a distribu-
tion closer to the goal of population equality than a normal curve, these target populations
would be held invalid if they represented the populations of congressional districts in the
same state. The largest congressional district, South Dakota's only district, contains 690,768
persons. The smallest congressional district, Montana's second, contains 376,629, a differ-
ence of 313,690, or a 72.4% variance.
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State Population
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Population of Average Congressional District
Legend: A = 1 Observation, B = 2 Observations
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other congressional districts in the same state. Second, votes are not
equalized by using total population as the redistricting base. If votes are
to be equalized, it would make more sense to use voting age population or
actual numbers of voters as the apportionment base. 66 Third, due to the
imprecision of the census, districts that were indicated as equipopulous
will not actually have the same population. Furthermore, rapid demo-
graphic changes ensure that districts will not longer be equal after only a
few years of population mobility.1
7
Given all of these problems of mathematics, does it make sense to use a
standard of precise census-based total population equality in congres-
sional districts? The Karcher Court answered this question in the affirm-
ative. Ttal population is the required base, according to the Court, be-
cause of'the command that Representatives "be elected by the People."
The worth of a vote depends on the number of citizens represented by
the elected official. Since the Court has established a strict mathematical
standard for congressional redistricting, the sensible course of action for
legislatures and other redistricting authorities would be to draw districts
containing equal numbers of people.168
B. Miscellaneous Problems
1. Deadlocks
Although the courts have consistently held that redistricting and reap-
portionment are tasks for the state legislatures, 169 deadlocks in the politi-
cal process have led to judicially-imposed reapportionments in several
states. 70 States should resolve this problem by implementing a system'
7
'
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING:
1980 (pre-publication tables) (1982) (source of data).
'6' While use of a registered voter base may be permissible, it is allowed only if it results
in a distribution not substantially different than that yielded by the use of a total popula-
tion base. See Burns v. Richardson, 353 U.S. 573 (1965). The theory behind this rule is that
legislators represent citizens, not just voters or voting-age citizens. See, e.g., Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
167 Since there is no way to accurately estimate the census undercounts or population
mobility within small geographic areas, the argument that these factors limit the utility of
census data was expressly rejected by Karcher. See supra notes 138, 139 and accompanying
text.
I" Advances in computer technology make it possible to draw an almost infinite number
of equipopulous district plans. The addition of other non-population criteria, such as parti-
san voting data, political sub-division boundaries, compactness requirements, or other de-
mographic data, reduces the number of possible plans, but it is still feasible to produce
equipopulous districts. See Sheth & Hess, Multiple Criteria in Political Redistricting, 2
RUTGERS J. OF COMPUTERS & LAW 44 (1971).
'6 See, e.g., Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 416 (1977).
170 See supra text accompanying notes 50-55, 76-84.
1 See, e.g., Rybicki v. State Bd. of Elections, 574 F. Supp. 1082 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (describ-
ing the Illinois requirement for the selection by lot of a tie-breaking member of the reappor-
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for breaking deadlocks, such as adopting bipartisan reapportionment au-
thorities with a tie-breaking member.
2. Staggered Elections
Challenges to staggered senatorial election calendars were successful in
several states in Round III,"' suggesting that this issue will continue to
be significant in future reapportionments. In an electoral system where
half of the State Senate is elected every two years, some of the other half
of the Senators completing their terms will have been elected by districts
that are, after the decennial census, unequal in population. Inevitably, at
least some segment of the population will not be able to elect a State
Senator for at least six years." 8
The simple solution to this dilemma is to change the election calendar
so that all of the post-reapportionment districts will be effective immedi-
ately. This result can be accompanied by truncating the terms of some of
the incumbent Senators, electing some of the new Senators for half-
terms, or electing all Senators at the same time.
3. Attorney General Pre-clearance
While pre-clearance of reapportionment plans by the Attorney General
has been at least somewhat effective in eliminating illegal discrimination,
the Round III experience suggests that delays in the pre-clearance pro-
cess led to delays in implementing valid reapportionment plans in several
states. 7 4 States should submit plans to the Department of Justice in a
timely manner, and the Attorney General should speed up consideration
of state redistricting and reapportionment plans. 7 '
D. Equipopulous Gerrymandering
The establishment of population equality as an overriding criteria for
evaluating redistricting and reapportionment plans has "sacrificed at the
altar of population equality" traditional anti-gerrymandering require-
ments of compactness and respect of boundaries of political subdivi-
sions.' " This enables the map maker to achieve constitutional respecta-
tionment commission).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 109-26.
173 As an example, district A voters may have elected a State Senator in 1978. In a 1981
reapportionment plan, a small portion of the district A voters might be placed in district B,
where an incumbent Senator was elected in 1980, and is not scheduled for an election until
1984. Thus, six years will pass until these district A voters now in district B will have an
opportunity to vote for a State Senator.
'" See supra note 58.
'5 See supra text accompanying notes 109-28.
'e Engstrom, supra note 5, at 210. Professor Engstrom notes that the Court has con-
strued the one person-one vote cases as "primarily a suffrage matter" which is easily quanti-
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bility for a gerrymandering simply by meeting equal population
requirements.
Gerrymandering has been described as the "thorniest nettle in the po-
litical thicket,' '1  and "an extremely difficult adjudication problem' '1 78
because of the difficulties inherent in developing adequate standards for
evaluating districting plans.1 7 9 Gerrymandering is nonetheless violative of
the equal protection clause as an invidious dilution of the voting rights of
individuals.8 0 The enactment of objective anti-gerrymandering criteria to
supplement the equal protection requirement would allow courts to eval-
uate districting arrangements along lines other than simple adherence to
population equality."'1 Congress and state legislatures should adopt objec-
tive and verifiable districting criteria so that the judiciary can effectively
evaluate districting plans and implement the notions of political fairness
underlying the Supreme Court's one person-one vote rule.
fiable, leading the Court to push to the periphery issues of qualitative representation, i.e.,
gerrymandering. Engstrom, Id. at 192. See also Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973)
(Connecticut legislative apportionment plan held unconstitutional due to excessive popula-
tion deviations).
While the emphasis on population equality as an overriding consideration has been suc-
cessful in eliminating the gross malapportionments of the 1960's, it has not improved the lot
of gerrymandering victims. Moreover, it leads plaintiffs to raise challenges on grounds other
than their true political motives. Plaintiffs challenge districting plans for minor variations in
population and "do not care a hoot about numbers or county lines .... These are simply
ploys for arguing in favor of one's own politically preferred plan, while pretending to be
concerned only with 'neutral' considerations." Dixon, Computers and Redistricting: A Plea
for Realism, 2 RUTGERS J. oF COMPUTERS & LAW 15, 18-19 (1971).
17 R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITIcs 491
(1968).
178 Engstrom, supra note 5, at 217.
179 See Note, Gerrymandering and One Man, One Vote, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 879 (1971).
180 Gerrymandering has been defined as "being a lot like pornography. You know it when
you see it, but it's awfully hard to define." Hearings on H.R. 8953 and Related Proposals on
Congressional Districting before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 98 (1971) (statement by Representative (now court of appeals Judge)
Abner Mikva).
There are, however, objective measures of gerrymandering, although none of them are
totally satisfactory. See Beckstrom, Robins & Eller, Issues in Gerrymandering: An Explora-
tory Measure of Partisan Gerrymandering Applied to Minnesota, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1121
(1978); Niemi & Deegan, A Theory of Political Districting, 72 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 304 (1978);
Kaiser, An Objective Method for Establishing Legislative Districts, 10 MIDWEST J. OF POL.
Sci. 200; Schwartzberg, Reapportionment, Gerrymandering and the Notion of Compact-
ness, 50 MINN. L. REV. 443 (1966); Note, Constitutional Challenges to Gerrymanders, 45
U. CHI. L. REV. 845 (1978).
'8 Anti-gerrymandering criteria would supplement, not supplant, equal-population re-
quirements. While addition of compactness or political sub-division requirements might be
only one more hurdle for the gerrymanderer to overcome, adherence to the doctrine of com-
pactness and to political sub-division boundaries necessarily limit the number of possibili-
ties for gerrymandering. Without some kind of anti-gerrymandering requirements, a com-
puter can produce infinite combinations of equipopulous districts to dilute voting strengths
of selected groups while fulfilling the equal population mandate.
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